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FOREWORD: THE CONFIDENT COURT
Jennifer Mason McAward*
I. INTRODUCTION
Institutional actors at the federal and state level often claim that
they deserve deference in the course of judicial review. Presidents,
legislators, and academics alike have defended the interpretive
competence of the coordinate branches of the federal government.'
Federal agencies point to their expertise in arguing for deference.2
And even certain state-run and private institutions have suggested
that their decisions warrant respect from the judicial branch.3
On a doctrinal level, the Supreme Court has agreed that there are
indeed certain types of decisions and decision makers to which it will
defer. Legislative fact-finding,4 agency rulemaking,s and the
educational assessments of state universities6  all deserve some
measure of judicial deference. For every rule, though, there is an
exception. The Court's decisions in its October 2012 Term show that
a majority of the Supreme Court is increasingly willing to supplant
both the prudential and legal judgments of other institutional actors.
Indeed, the Court this Term proved itself to be a confident
institution, poised and willing to actively review policy judgments
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame Law School; J.D., New York
University School of Law, 1998; B.A., University of Notre Dame, 1994. Thank you to my
outstanding research assistant Colin Littlefield.
1. See, e.g., Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 10 Op. Att'y Gen.
74 (1861) (attorney general opinion defending President Lincoln's decision to suspend the writ of
habeas corpus and detain a suspected secessionist in disregard of a Supreme Court order);
Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Merryman Power and the Dilemma of Autonomous Executive
Branch Interpretation, 15 CARDOzO L. REv. 81, 85 (1993) (Each coordinate branch "has
completely independent interpretive authority within the sphere of its powers.").
2. See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)
(setting forth principles of deference to agency regulations).
3. See, e.g., PAUL HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS (2013) (discussing
deference to universities, churches, and civic organizations).
4. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
5. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-44.
6. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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made by Congress and executive agencies, as well as the operational
details of programs adopted by state governments and institutions.
Three years ago in these pages, Dean Erwin Chemerinsky noted
that the Supreme Court's rulings in the late 1980s "emphasized great
deference to the decisions of the elected branches of government."7
He lamented the Roberts Court's increasing willingness to substitute
its own judgment for that of majoritarian institutions, and suggested
that this is evidence of an ascendant, activist, conservative judicial
8ideology. Whether or not Dean Chemerinsky was correct in
assessing the cause of the Court's pivot,9 he certainly identified a
clear trend in the Court's decision-making methodology. Deference
is on the wane. Assertions of judicial competence are on the rise. The
October 2012 Term provides further evidence of this trend, as well as
its extension beyond disregard for majoritarian institutions. This
Term, the Court proved itself willing to disregard the views of non-
majoritarian institutions that traditionally have been thought to
deserve a measure of judicial deference.
Rather than attempt to identify the motivation for such a shift, I
suggest simply that today's Supreme Court is a confident one. A core
group of Justices has an increasingly self-assured view of the
judiciary's ability to conduct an independent assessment of both the
legal and factual aspects of the cases that come before the Court.
Several cases from the October 2012 Term illustrate the Court's shift
away from deference. In each, the lower courts had embraced, and at
least one party had defended, a posture of deference toward the
challenged governmental program or decision. The Supreme Court
ultimately disregarded those calls for deference and instead asserted
and exercised its own independent judgment. In all, one is left with
the impression of a high court that has fully embraced its "duty . .. to
say what the law is."10
7. Erwin Chemerinsky, Supreme Court-October Term 2009 Foreword: Conservative
Judicial Activism, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 863, 866 (2011) (citing Erwin Chemerinsky, Foreword:
The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REv. 44,48-49 (1989)).
8. Id.
9. Id. The Court's confidence transcends ideology, at least in some cases. This Term, the
Court was equally willing to closely examine and strike down federal laws extending as well as
withdrawing civil rights protections. Compare Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013)
(striking down provisions of Voting Rights Act), with United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675
(2013) (striking down section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act).
10. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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II. COMPETENCE TO REVIEW THE ADMISSIONS PROGRAMS OF STATE
UNIVERSITIES: FISHER V. UNIVERSITY OF TExAS
Fisher v. University of Texas" provides this Term's clearest
assertion of the Court's confidence in its own competence to evaluate
the factual underpinnings of state programs. When the Court granted
certiorari in Fisher, many foresaw a sweeping opinion on the
constitutionality of affirmative action.12 What most commentators
and interested parties overlooked, 13 however, was the peculiar
manner in which the Fifth Circuit panel had described its mode of
review of the University of Texas's race-conscious admissions
program, even while labeling it as strict scrutiny. Strict scrutiny, of
course, traditionally places on the state actor the burden of proving
that a racial classification is narrowly tailored to accomplish a
compelling state interest. 14
In accordance with Grutter v. Bollinger,15 the Fifth Circuit
stated that it would defer to a university's academic judgment that
diversity is a compelling interest.1 6  While such deference is
traditionally not associated with strict scrutiny,17 the Grutter majority
11. 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
12. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Faces Weighty Cases and a New Dynamic, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 29, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/30/us/supreme-court-faces-crucial-
cases-in-new-session.html.
13. Although the petition for certiorari focused heavily on this issue, Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari at 23-35, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345), 2011 WL
4352286, at *23-35, once the merits briefing began, the petitioner relegated this concern to page
forty-seven of its fifty-seven-page brief, Brief for Petitioner at 47, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S.
Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345), 2012 WL 1882759, at *47. Moreover, very few of the ninety-eight
amicus briefs filed either at the certiorari or merits stages focused on the standard of review. See,
e.g., Brief of the Asian American Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at
7-9, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345), 2011 WL 5040038, at *7-9;
Brief of the Southeastern Legal Foundation, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 5-29,
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345), 2012 WL 1961248, at *5-29. A few
commentators did note the issue. See, e.g., Jennifer Mason McAward, Good Faith and Narrow
Tailoring in Fisher v. University of Texas, 59 Loy. L. REV. 77, 81 (2013) (discussing the
likelihood that the Court will use Fisher "to clarify that the university bears the entire burden of
justifying a race-based classification"); Lyle Denniston, UPDA TED: New Test of College
Affirmative Action, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 15, 2011, 10:59 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com
/?p=127255 (noting that the Fifth Circuit had concluded that "j]udicial review of a college's use
of race ... is less rigorous than for other official uses of race").
14. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003).
15. Id.
16. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 631 F.3d 213, 232 (5th Cir. 2011), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 2411
(2013).
17. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 379-80 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); see also Ozan 0. Varol,
Strict in Theory, but Accommodating in Fact?, 75 Mo. L. REv. 1243, 1253 (2010) ("[T]he
Grutter Court was not faithful to the tenets of the traditional strict-scrutiny test.").
2014] 38 1
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stated that such deference was appropriate in educational affirmative-
action cases because, first, courts lack expertise to make such
"complex educational judgments"' 8  and, second, the First
Amendment protects the educational autonomy of universities. 19
Thus, Grutter recognized that strict scrutiny could accommodate a
level of deference with respect to the question of whether a
university's asserted interest in diversity was compelling.
The Fifth Circuit, however, extended that deference into the
narrow-tailoring prong of the strict-scrutiny inquiry, stating that it
would give a "degree of deference" to "the university's good faith
determination that certain race-conscious measures are necessary" to
achieve diversity.20 Moreover, the court stated that it would assess
the university's good faith by "scrutiniz[ing] the University's
decisionmaking process" rather than the "merits of [its] decision"
regarding how to structure its affirmative action policy.2 1 Finally, the
court accorded the university a rebuttable presumption that it had
indeed operated in good faith in creating its affirmative action
program.22
Thus, with respect to both prongs of the strict-scrutiny inquiry,
the Fifth Circuit majority deferred to the university's institutional
judgments. Judge Garza wrote a special concurrence in which he
agreed that the majority correctly applied Grutter, but lamented that
Grutter itself "applied a level of scrutiny markedly less demanding"
than strict scrutiny should be.23 Judge Garza questioned the "unusual
deference" given to universities and attempted to identify a number
of factors courts could employ in evaluating whether an affirmative-
action program is narrowly tailored.24
Writing for a seven-member majority, Justice Kennedy
concluded that the Fifth Circuit's review deviated from Grutter and
failed to impose "the demanding burden of strict scrutiny"25 on the
University of Texas's admissions program. While he accepted
Grutter's holding that educational diversity was a compelling state
18. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328 (majority opinion).
19. Id. at 329.
20. See Fisher, 631 F.3d at 232-33.
21. Id. at 231 (emphasis added).
22. Id. at 231-32.
23. Id. at 247 (Garza, J., specially concurring).
24. Id. at 253.
25. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2415 (2013).
382
interest, 26 he also stated that intensive judicial review of any
affirmative-action process was a "clear precondition" for such a
program: "Race may not be considered unless the admissions process
can withstand strict scrutiny." 27
Strict scrutiny, as the Fisher Court described it, "is a searching
examination, and it is the government that bears the burden to prove
'that the reasons for any [racial] classification [are] clearly identified
and unquestionably legitimate."' 28 The Court condemned the Fifth
Circuit's willingness to defer to the university with respect to the
narrow-tailoring prong of strict scrutiny and rejected the lower
court's application of a rebuttable presumption of good faith.29
Rather, the Court repeatedly emphasized that deference with respect
to narrow tailoring is inappropriate and that it "remains at all times
the University's obligation to demonstrate, and the Judiciary's
obligation to determine" that an affirmative action program is
"specifically and narrowly framed" to attain diversity. 30 The Court
made clear that while it may "take account of a university's
experience and expertise," it would be the Court's ultimate
responsibility to evaluate the university's mode of individually
assessing applicants, as well as to inquire carefully as to whether the
university "could achieve sufficient diversity without using racial
classifications." 31 On this latter point, the Court "must ultimately be
satisfied that no workable race-neutral alternatives would produce
the educational benefits of diversity."32 The university's "good faith
consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives" is one data point
the Court will consider, but it is incumbent upon the university to
convince the Court not just that it followed a certain deliberative
process, but that "available, workable race-neutral alternatives do not
suffice." 33
26. Id. at 2418.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 2419 (alteration in original) (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469, 505 (1989)).
29. The Court declined to consider whether Grutter's deference to the university's
assessment of its compelling interest in diversity was appropriate because "the parties here d[id]
not ask the Court to revisit that aspect of Grutter's holding." See id.
30. Id. at 2420.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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Thus, the Court used Fisher not to opine on the constitutionality
of affirmative-action programs but rather to issue a pointed reminder
of the importance of the Court's own role in assessing such
programs. The Fisher Court claimed competence to assess the
operational details of an affirmative-action admissions program, as
well as the workability of race-neutral alternatives. And it explicitly
rejected a university's claim to greater institutional competence with
respect to these aspects of its programs.34 Thus, Fisher provides a
stark, if not unsurprising, example of the Court's confidence in its
ability to evaluate the factual assessments underlying race-conscious
state programs.
III. COMPETENCE TO REVIEW THE FACTUAL FINDINGS OF CONGRESS:
SHELBY COUNTY V. HOLDER
While the Fisher opinion focused on judicial process, the
Court's decision in Shelby County v. Holder is a sweeping decision
on the merits that held unconstitutional section 4(b) of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965,35 which had set forth a formula for determining
which jurisdictions would be required to seek federal preclearance
for changes to voting rules.36 Although the Shelby County majority
was opaque as to its standard of review, its willingness to disregard
the 15,000-plus page legislative record developed during the 2006
reauthorization of the Voting Rights Act bespeaks the Court's
confidence in its own ability to assess that formula on its merits and
to displace Congress's judgment as to its current viability.37
Writing for a five-member majority, Chief Justice Roberts held
that the coverage formula-which was repeatedly reenacted without
changes, most recently in 2006-bore no "logical" 38  or
"sufficien[t]" 39 relationship to "current conditions." 40 The Court
condemned Congress for failing to adjust the formula to reflect the
current record of electoral abuses and deciding instead to use a
formula "based on decades-old data and eradicated practices."4 1 The
34. Id. at 2420-21.
35. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2613 (2013).
36. Id. at 2630-31.
37. Id. at 2636 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 2629 (majority opinion).
39. Id. at 2627.
40. Id. at 2629.
41. Id. at 2627.
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Court declined to defer to the 2006 legislative record cataloguing
attempts at voting discrimination because that record "played no role
in shaping the statutory formula" before the Court.42
Strangely, the Shelby County majority's analysis did not
mention Congress's power to "enforce" the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments,43 pursuant to which the Voting Rights Act and
subsequent reauthorizations had been passed. Traditionally, laws
passed pursuant to Congress's power under the Reconstruction
Amendments have received highly deferential review in the federal
courts governed by McCulloch v. Maryland,44 which held that
Congress deserves substantial deference in choosing the means by
which to effectuate its enumerated powers. 45 As the Court held in
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, the Fifteenth Amendment
enforcement power permits Congress to "use any rational means to
effectuate the constitutional prohibition of racial discrimination in
voting." 46 Indeed, the district court and court of appeals in the Shelby
County case invoked this standard and both determined that the
extensive record of voting discrimination amassed by Congress in
2006, as well as "Congress's predictive judgment about the
continued need for [preclearance] in covered jurisdictions,"
warranted "substantial deference."47
The Shelby County Court instead invoked a different aspect of
McCulloch, emphasizing that Congress's chosen means of
combatting voting discrimination were not "'consist[ent] with the
42. Id. at 2629.
43. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2. The Court briefly
mentioned the Fifteenth Amendment enforcement power, Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2629, but
did not suggest that it informed the Court's standard of review.
44. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
45. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (13th Amendment); Katzenbach
v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (14th Amendment); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301
(1966) (15th Amendment), abrogated by Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). Some
scholars have suggested that McCulloch does not warrant such a high level of deference to
Congress. See, e.g., J. Randy Beck, The Heart of Federalism: Pretext Review of Means-End
Relationships, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 407, 427 (2003); Jennifer Mason McAward, McCulloch
and the Thirteenth Amendment, 112 COLUM. L. REv. 1769 (2012).
46. South Carolina, 383 U.S. at 324.
47. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 811 F. Supp. 2d 424, 498 (D.D.C. 2011), affd, 679 F.3d 848
(D.C. Cir. 2012), rev'd, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013); see also Shelby Cnty., 679 F.3d at 858 ("Given
this, the district court concluded that Congress's predictive judgment about the continued need for
section 5 in covered jurisdictions was due 'substantial deference,' and therefore 'decline[d] to
overturn Congress's carefully considered judgment."' (citations omitted)).
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letter and spirit of the constitution."'48 Specifically, the Court
objected that requiring specified jurisdictions to seek preclearance
imposed significant burdens on the constitutional principle of equal
state sovereignty. 49 Thus, while McCulloch traditionally has been
invoked to support judicial deference to congressional legislation, the
Court viewed that case as supporting judicial intervention and
increased scrutiny when federal laws impinge on principles of
constitutional structure.
This change in emphasis and departure from deference is not
entirely surprising. In the Fourteenth Amendment context, the
Supreme Court has largely jettisoned the deferential reading of
McCulloch, asserting instead the Court's own competence to review
both the factual record of constitutional violations developed by
Congress and the "congruence and proportionality" between those
violations and Congress's chosen means of redressing them.o The
Shelby County majority, however, ignored the debate about whether
to apply this same standard of review to Fifteenth Amendment
legislation5' and simply asserted that the extensive legislative record
bore no "logical" or "substantial" relation to the coverage formula at
issue. The majority declined to respond to Justice Ginsburg's
dissenting opinion (and the lower court opinions), which detailed the
ways in which Congress had in fact considered the adequacy and
accuracy of the coverage formula in 2006, and argued that this
legislative record deserved deference. 52
While it is difficult to discern a clear rule or standard emanating
from Shelby County, the majority's approach strongly suggests a
high level of confidence in the Court's own ability to assess a
48. Shelby Cnty, 811 F. Supp. 2d at 451 (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421).
49. Id. at 427-28.
50. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 508 (1997).
51. See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 204 (2009). The D.C.
Circuit in Shelby County held that Congress's 2006 record deserved deference even under the
elevated City ofBoerne standard. See Shelby Cnty., 679 F.3d at 861, 873.
52. Retired Justice John Paul Stevens has critiqued the Shelby County majority for
"fail[ing] ... to explain" why a decision to discard an outdated preclearance formula "should be
made by the members of the Supreme Court" rather than "[t]he members of Congress ... [who]
are far more likely to evaluate correctly the risk that the" politics of the former confederate states
are still driven significantly by white supremacy. See John Paul Stevens, The Court & the Right to
Vote: A Dissent, THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS (Aug. 15, 2013), www.nybooks.com
/articles/archives/2013/aug/15/the-court-right-to-vote-dissent/?pagination=false (reviewing GARY
MAY, BENDING TOWARD JUSTICE: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2013)).
386
FORE WORD
legislative record and to displace Congress's predictive policy
judgments. As Linda Greenhouse has noted, "distrust of Congress
radiates from the majority's every page." 53 Moreover, Shelby County
may signal the Court's increasing willingness to distance itself from
the deferential posture that McCulloch v. Maryland has long been
thought to endorse for the Court vis-A-vis Congress and to embrace a
more active role in evaluating federal legislation passed pursuant to
Congress's powers under the Reconstruction Amendments.
It bears noting that not all of the Court's 2012 Term opinions
involving Congress resulted in the Court supplanting congressional
judgments with its own. Indeed, at first glance, United States v.
Kebodeaux54 seems at odds with the thesis that the Court is
increasingly willing to scrutinize congressional action. In
Kebodeaux, the Court held that the federal Sex Offender Registration
and Notification Act (SORNA) was an appropriate exercise of
Congress's power under the Military Regulation and Necessary and
Proper Clauses.55 Justice Breyer's opinion for the five-member
majority quoted McCulloch and stated that Congress has "large
discretion as to the means that may be employed in executing a given
power.',56 It is a job for Congress, the majority said, to "weigh
[conflicting] evidence and to reach a rational conclusion" regarding
policy questions.5 7 Thus, the majority deferred to Congress's
assessment of the safety benefits of registration rules for sex
offenders.
The separate opinions in Kebodeaux tell a different story,
however, and point to a group of Justices that is increasingly willing
to rethink longstanding doctrine in order to expand the judiciary's
oversight of Congress. For example, Chief Justice Roberts concurred
in the Kebodeaux judgment, agreeing that Congress was empowered
to pass SORNA. However, he declined to join the majority's
opinion for fear that its discussion of the safety benefits of
registration rules might imply incorrectly that Congress has "a
53. Linda Greenhouse, Current Conditions, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2013, http://opinionator
.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/06/26/current-conditions/.
54. 133 S. Ct. 2496 (2013).
55. Id. at 2505.
56. Id. at 2503 (quoting Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 355 (1903)).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 2505-06 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
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federal police power." 59 He cited McCulloch, not for its suggestion
of judicial deference, but for its assertion that Congress's powers
"'are limited' and that no 'great substantive and independent power'
can be 'implied as incidental to other powers, or used as a means of
executing them."' 60 The sheer breadth of a federal police power,
Chief Justice Roberts argued, would be inconsistent "with the letter
and spirit of the Constitution,"61 and therefore such a power is not
"proper" within the meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause. 62
Chief Justice Roberts, therefore, used Kebodeaux as an
opportunity to stake out a view that there are indeed limits to what
Congress can do under the Necessary and Proper Clause. He
implicitly tapped into scholarship asserting that the concept of
propriety under the Necessary and Proper Clause provides an
independent metric for assessing federal legislation and that laws that
infringe on structural constitutional values are improper and thus
invalid under the Clause. 63
Justice Thomas's Kebodeaux dissent made this claim even more
64
explicitly. As he had written in United States v. Comstock, Justice
Thomas-joined by Justice Scalia in both cases 65-argued that the
Necessary and Proper Clause empowers federal legislation under two
conditions. First, the law must be "directed toward a 'legitimate'
end," namely, the execution of a power expressly vested in Congress
by Article I.66 "Second, there must be a necessary and proper fit
between the 'means' (the federal law) and the 'end' (the enumerated
power or powers) it is designed to serve."67 While Justice Thomas
has acknowledged that "McCulloch accords Congress a certain
amount of discretion in assessing means-end fit under this second
inquiry," 68 he clearly contemplates active judicial review on both
59. Id. at 2507.
60. Id. (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421, 411).
61. Id. (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421).
62. See id.
63. See Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The "Proper" Scope of Federal Power: A
Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267 (1993).
64. 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1970 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
65. See Kebodeaux, 133 S. Ct. at 2510 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (Justice Scalia joined as to
all parts except Part III.A.); Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1970 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (Justice Scalia
joined as to all parts except Part III.A. 1.b.).
66. Kebodeaux, 133 S. Ct. at 2511 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at
1971 (Thomas, J., dissenting)).
67. Id. (quoting Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1971 (Thomas, J., dissenting)).
68. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1971 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
388
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fronts. With respect to the second inquiry, the judiciary must ask
whether Congress's chosen means are "'appropriate' and 'plainly
adapted' to the exercise of an enumerated power," and "not
otherwise 'prohibited' by" or "[in]consistent with" the
Constitution.69 Thus, in cases where McCulloch was thought to
mandate judicial deference, Justice Thomas has advocated for more
intensive judicial review and proven himself willing to strike down
federal laws.
Thus, while Shelby County provides a concrete example of the
Supreme Court's willingness to displace congressional fact finding
and policy judgments, it would be too easy to dismiss that opinion as
an outlier motivated by the Justices' political preferences.
Kebodeaux demonstrates that the Court is still willing to defer to
certain congressional judgments, but the separate opinions in that
case-read in conjunction with Shelby County-point to an
energized element of the Court that is explicitly prepared to assert
the judiciary's power and competence to review a broad range of
federal legislation.
IV. COMPETENCE TO REVIEw EXECUTIVE AGENCY POLICY
GUIDANCE: VANCE V. BALL STATE UNIVERSITY AND UNIVERSITY OF
TEXAS SOUTHWESTERN MEDICAL CENTER V. NASSAR
The Supreme Court long has accorded varying degrees of
deference to the views of executive agencies charged with
implementing federal law. In two cases this Term, the Court applied
traditional doctrine to defer to an agency's interpretation of its own
regulations,70 as well as an agency's interpretation of a statutory
ambiguity concerning the agency's own jurisdiction." As in
Kebodeaux, each case generated a separate opinion from Chief
Justice Roberts arguing for greater judicial scrutiny of administrative
interpretations. 7 2
69. Kebodeaux, 133 S. Ct. at 2511 (quoting Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1972 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting)).
70. See Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1337-08 (2013) (applying
deference under Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997)).
71. See City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1874-75 (2013) (applying Chevron
deference).
72. See City ofArlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1877 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); Decker, 133 S. Ct. at
1338-39 (Roberts, C.J., concurring); see also Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1339-44 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (arguing for greater judicial scrutiny of administrative interpretations).
38992014]
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In two other cases, however, a five-member majority of the
Court declined to defer to two longstanding policy guidances issued
by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).
Chevron deference does not apply to the EEOC because Congress
did not confer upon that body the authority to promulgate rules or
regulations. However, the EEOC routinely issues policy guidances
regarding Title VII and the other statutes it is charged with
implementing. The Court has long held that such EEOC guidances
and guidelines warrant deference to the extent the administrative
judgment has the "power to persuade." 73 Specifically, the EEOC's
"policy statements, embodied in its compliance manual and internal
directives ... reflect a body of experience and informed judgment"
that entitle them to "a measure of respect." 74 This level of deference
to the agency-termed Skidmore deference for the case that first
discussed it7 5 -depends upon the degree of care in its formulation,
its consistency, formality, and relative expertness, and upon the
persuasiveness of the agency's position.76 Since the 1970s, the Court
has split in its approach to EEOC cases, deferring to EEOC policy
guidances in roughly half the cases before it.77 This past Term,
however, the balance tipped away from deference to the EEOC.
In Vance v. Ball State University,78 the Court considered the
meaning of the term "supervisor" for purposes of assigning vicarious
73. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift &
Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)), superseded by statute, Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42
U.S.C. § 2000(e)(k), as recognized in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
74. Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 399 (2008) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
75. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
76. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001) (citing Skidmore, 323 U.S. at
139-40).
77. See Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863, 870-71 (2011) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring) (noting that the Court's decision "accords with the longstanding views of the
[EEOC]" as articulated in its compliance manual); Holowecki, 552 U.S. at 399 (2008) (deferring
to EEOC compliance manual); Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P. C. v. Wells, 538 U.S.
440, 449 (2003) (same); Edelman v. Lynchburg Coll., 535 U.S. 106, 114 (2002) (same); Local
No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 517-18 (1986) (same);
Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (same); Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty,
434 U.S. 136, 142 n.4 (1977) (same). But see Ky. Ret. Sys. v. EEOC, 554 U.S. 135, 150 (2008)
(declining to follow EEOC compliance manual); Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540
U.S. 581, 600 (2004) (declining to follow EEOC ruling); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527
U.S. 471, 480 (1999) (declining to follow EEOC guidance); EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499
U.S. 244, 257-58 (1991) (same); Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 69 (1986)
(same); Gen. Elec. Co., 429 U.S. at 143 (same).
78. 133 S. Ct. 2434 (2013).
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liability under Title VII. The EEOC had issued an Enforcement
Guidance in 1999, adopting an open-ended approach to that term and
tying supervisory status to the ability to exercise significant direction
over another employee's daily work.79 The Vance majority rejected
the EEOC's view and instead adopted a narrower definition focused
on the supervisor's ability to take tangible employment actions (i.e.,
significant changes in employment status) against the victim. The
majority determined that the EEOC's rule was "murky,"80  open-
ended,"8' and susceptible of inconsistent application. The Court
declined to defer to the EEOC for fear that its "standard[] would
present daunting problems for the lower federal courts and for
juries." 82 Dissenting, Justice Ginsburg took the majority to task for,
among other things, failing to accord due deference to the EEOC's
guidance. What the majority took for ambiguity, Justice Ginsburg
lauded as a "powerfully persuasive" view grounded in the realities of
workplace structure.83
In University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar,84
the Court considered the proper causation standard for Title VII
retaliation claims. As in Vance, the EEOC had issued guidance and a
compliance manual opining that such claims required evidence that
retaliation was a motivating factor of the challenged action, as
opposed to its but-for cause. The EEOC justified this position as
consistent with both prior judicial decisions and the statutory purpose
of allowing remedies for retaliation. The Nassar majority found that
these explanations "lack[ed] . . . persuasive force" and therefore did
not warrant deference. 86 Justice Ginsburg again dissented, arguing
that the EEOC's "well-reasoned and longstanding guidance"87
merited respect.
79. See U.S. EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: VICARIOUS
EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR UNLAWFUL HARASSMENT BY SUPERVISORS 3-4 (1999), available at
Westlaw 1999 WL 33305874.
80. Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2449.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 2450.
83. Id. at 2462.
84. 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013).
85. 2 U.S. EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 8-II(E)(1)
(Mar. 2003).
86. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2533.
87. Id. at 2540 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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Vance and Nassar thus further substantiate the claim that
today's Court is a confident one. While it was possible to make a
legal and pragmatic argument in favor of deference to the EEOC in
both cases, the Court instead opted to exercise its own independent
judgment in construing the requirements of Title VII.
V. CONCLUSION
The October 2012 Term was a particularly high profile one for
the Supreme Court because so many of its cases involved politically
charged topics, including affirmative action,8 8 voting rights,89 gay
marriage, 90 gene patenting,91 and the collection of DNA data from
criminal arrestees.92 While it might be tempting to evaluate the Term
by focusing on the outcomes of these cases, I suggest that there is a
more important story lurking just under the surface. That story is one
about judicial process. The Court proved itself increasingly willing to
disregard the legal and policy judgments of Congress, state
universities, and federal agencies-institutions to which the Court
has, in the past, said it would defer at least under certain
circumstances. While the Court will always formally embrace
principles of deference grounded in separation of powers or
institutional competence, its willingness to exercise its own judgment
and disregard the considered views of other institutions was on full
display this Term. Time will tell whether the Court's confidence, as
exhibited in cases like Fisher, Shelby County, Vance, and Nasser, is
indeed part of a larger trend.
88. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
89. See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
90. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct.
2652 (2013).
91. See Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
92. See Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013).
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